Arbeitspapier
Tactical refereeing and signaling by publishing
A peer review is used ubiquitously in hiring, promotional, and evaluation decisions, within academia and beyond. It is usually conducted to allocate limited resources, such as the budget of a funder or the pages of a journal. With limited capacity, a peer review may lead to negatively biased evaluations precisely because approving a peer's worthy project lowers the chance that a referee's own project will be approved. I show that limited capacity is inconsistent with a hypothesis that the decision-maker's policy is to stimulate efforts, and I discuss possible decision-maker motivations that could lead to a limited capacity policy.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Cardiff Economics Working Papers ; No. E2022/14
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Subject
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refereeing
peer review
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Popov, Sergey V.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
- (where)
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Cardiff
- (when)
-
2022
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Popov, Sergey V.
- Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School
Time of origin
- 2022
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