Arbeitspapier

Localized competition, multimarket operation and collusive behavior

This paper studies collusive behavior in a repeated oligopoly model with localized competition. Private information about the rivals' past actions naturally arises from this product market structure. The resulting communication problems imply that firms should adopt strategies with sufficiently lenient punishments. Infinite grim punishments are too severe for large discount factors. The standard stick-and-carrot punishments from the perfect public information model are too severe for all discount factors. Modified stickand- carrot punishments can be used, though for a smaller range of discount factors than the standard stick-and-carrot punishments under public information.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 97-3

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Verboven, Frank
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
1997

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Verboven, Frank
  • Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)

Time of origin

  • 1997

Other Objects (12)