Decentralised Job Matching

Arbeitspapier

This paper studies a decentralised job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents' actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 114.2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Labor Contracts
• Subject: Two-sided matching ; Job market ; Subgame perfect equilibrium ; irreversibilities ; Suchtheorie ; Dynamisches Spiel ; Theorie ; Matching

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Haeringer, Guillaume ; Wooders, Myrna
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118137
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:46 AM CET