Arbeitspapier

Hybrid R&D

We develop a model of R&D collaboration in which individual firms carry out in-house research on core activities and undertake bilateral joint projects on non-core activities with other firms. We develop conditions on the profit functions of the firm under which R&D investments in different projects of a firm are complementary. We show that this condition is met by standard price and quantity setting oligopoly models. We then study the relation between the number of joint projects and investments and profits. In this context, we identify a second aspect of complementarity: Equilibrium investments in in-house as well as in each joint project are increasing in the number of projects. However, we find that an increase in number of joint projects of all firms lowers collective profits, suggesting the presence of excessive incentives for conducting research.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 03-041/1

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Thema
in-house R&D
joint R&D
oligopoly
cooperation
Industrieforschung
Forschungskooperation
Spillover-Effekt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Goyal, Sanjeev
Konovalov, Alexander
Moraga, Jose Luis
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Goyal, Sanjeev
  • Konovalov, Alexander
  • Moraga, Jose Luis
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2003

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