Arbeitspapier
Auctions when Bidders Prepare by Investing in Ideas
We consider auction games where, prior to the auction, bidders spend resources to increase their valuations. The market game is solved by solving an equivalent auxiliary social choice problem. We show that standard auctions are fully efficient, whereas reserve price requirements entail a double inefficiency. Moreover, we explain how optimal auctions differ from the well-known static optimum, and sketch the impact of information spillovers.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 258
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Auctions
procurement
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jeitschko, Thomas D.
Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jeitschko, Thomas D.
- Wolfstetter, Elmar G.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2000
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