Arbeitspapier
Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies
We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection. Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles or selling 'at-fault' insurance can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2007/22
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Externalities
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
- Subject
-
Externality
Mitigation
Insurance
Versicherungsökonomik
Versicherungsschaden
Haftung
Entscheidung bei Risiko
Konsuminterdependenz
Spieltheorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Kunreuther, Howard
Muermann, Alexander
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
- (where)
-
Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
-
2007
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-39822
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kunreuther, Howard
- Muermann, Alexander
- Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
Time of origin
- 2007