Arbeitspapier

Self-protection and insurance with interdependencies

We study optimal investment in self-protection of insured individuals when they face interdependencies in the form of potential contamination from others. If individuals cannot coordinate their actions, then the positive externality of investing in self-protection implies that, in equilibrium, individuals underinvest in self-protection. Limiting insurance coverage through deductibles or selling 'at-fault' insurance can partially internalize this externality and thereby improve individual and social welfare.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CFS Working Paper ; No. 2007/22

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Externalities
Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General
Subject
Externality
Mitigation
Insurance
Versicherungsökonomik
Versicherungsschaden
Haftung
Entscheidung bei Risiko
Konsuminterdependenz
Spieltheorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Kunreuther, Howard
Muermann, Alexander
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)
(where)
Frankfurt a. M.
(when)
2007

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30-39822
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Kunreuther, Howard
  • Muermann, Alexander
  • Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS)

Time of origin

  • 2007

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