Journal article | Zeitschriftenartikel

E-Baying for Blood? Non-competitive flexible pricing in entertainment ticketing: Some demand side evidence

This paper gives some exploratory results from estimating a consumer surplus type equation which features a number of economic and demographic variables as regressors. We calculate an income elasticity for the maximum surplus that individuals would ever perceive themselves to be getting by being allowed to buy at a set price. The results also show that those who attend the cinema are significantly less inclined to generate a surplus in flexible price events markets whilst young adults offer to pay quite a large amount more for their heavily desired entertainment. This suggests that part of the burden of a shift in ticket pricing methods may be borne by the parents of young adults.

E-Baying for Blood?  Non-competitive flexible pricing in entertainment ticketing: Some demand side evidence

E-Baying for Blood? Non-competitive flexible pricing in entertainment ticketing: Some demand side evidence | Urheber*in: Cameron, Samuel

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Umfang
Seite(n): 1315-1322
Sprache
Englisch
Anmerkungen
Status: Postprint; begutachtet (peer reviewed)

Erschienen in
Applied Economics, 40(10)

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Cameron, Samuel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wann)
2008

DOI
URN
urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-240559
Rechteinformation
GESIS - Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften. Bibliothek Köln
Letzte Aktualisierung
21.06.2024, 16:26 MESZ

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Objekttyp

  • Zeitschriftenartikel

Beteiligte

  • Cameron, Samuel

Entstanden

  • 2008

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