Arbeitspapier

Barriers to Export

A model of entry by a small exporting country into a large country market with an incumbent monopolist is constructed, and export promotion policy is examined. In the presence of strategic entry deterrence by the large country incumbent firm a number of situations can emerge, including the possibility that, in the event of trade liberalization between countries, exports based on cost differences may fail to emerge, and a possibility that export promotion is world welfare improving. A model of multiple export markets with incomplete information on the part of the government is also considered. There it is shown that a policy of export promotion suffers from adverse selection (inefficient entry to export markets), but that this problem can be mitigated in the presence of incumbent monopolists in the potential export market who can actively deter entry.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 775

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
export subsidies
entry deterrence
economic integration

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Harris, Richard G.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
1990

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Harris, Richard G.
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1990

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