Genetic Information: Comparing Alternative Regulatory Approaches when Prevention Matters

Arbeitspapier

We compare the alternative approaches for regulating genetic information in the health insurance market when prevention measures are available. In the model, firms offer insurance contracts to consumers who are initially uninformed of their risk type but can obtain such information by performing a costless genetic test. A crucial ingredient of our analysis is that information has decision-making value since it allows for optimal choice of a self-insurance action (secondary prevention). We focus on the welfare properties of market equilibria obtained under the different regulatory schemes and, by using an intuitive graphical analysis, we rank them unambiguously. Our results show that Disclosure Duty weakly dominates the other regulatory schemes and that Strict Prohibition represents the worst regulatory approach.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 657

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Krankenversicherung ; Gesundheitsvorsorge ; Gesundheitspolitik ; Genetik ; Selbstversicherung ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Barigozzi, Francesca ; Henriet, Dominique
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
• (wo): Bologna
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4589
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159498
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ