Arbeitspapier

An Experimental Test of Precautionary Bidding

Auctions often involve goods exhibiting a common knowledge ex-post risk that is independent of buyers’ private values or their signals regarding common value components. Esö and White (2004) showed theoretically that ex-post risk leads to precautionary bidding for DARA bidders: Agents reduce their bids by more than their appropriate risk premium. Testing precautionary bidding with data from the field seems almost impossible. We conduct experimental first-price auctions that allow us to directly identify the precautionary premium and find clear evidence for precautionary bidding. Bidders are significantly better off when a risky object rather than an equally valued sure object is auctioned. Our results are robust if we control for potentially confounding decision biases.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Munich Discussion Paper ; No. 2010-30

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Auctions
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Thema
precautionary bidding
prudence
auction
experiment
Auktionstheorie
Entscheidung bei Risiko
Risikoprämie
Test

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kocher, Martin G.
Pahlke, Julius
Trautmann, Stefan T.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät
(wo)
München
(wann)
2010

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.11743
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-11743-5
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kocher, Martin G.
  • Pahlke, Julius
  • Trautmann, Stefan T.
  • Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät

Entstanden

  • 2010

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