Arbeitspapier

The political economy of fiscal supervision and budget deficits: Evidence from Germany

In many federal countries, local governments run large deficits, even when fiscal supervision by state authorities is tight. I investigate to which extent party alignment of governments and fiscal supervisors influences budget deficits. The dataset includes 427 German local governments for the period 2000-2004. I exploit a period after a far-reaching institutional reform that entirely re-distributed political powers on both the government level and the fiscal supervisor level. Results do not show that party alignments of governments and supervisors (co-partisanship) drive short-term deficits. Instead, I find that the ideology of partisan governments and supervisors matters: left-wing local governments run higher deficits than their right-wing counterparts; left-wing supervisors tolerate higher deficits than right-wing supervisors. These findings imply that political independence for fiscal supervisors is recommended.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CEPIE Working Paper ; No. 02/17

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
National Deficit; Surplus
State and Local Borrowing
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession
Thema
Local government
Budget deficits
Fiscal supervision
Partisan cycle

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Roesel, Felix
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE)
(wo)
Dresden
(wann)
2017

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:14-qucosa-217869
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Roesel, Felix
  • Technische Universität Dresden, Center of Public and International Economics (CEPIE)

Entstanden

  • 2017

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