Arbeitspapier

Guess what: It's the Settlements!

Exchanges and other trading platforms are often vertically integrated to carry out trading and settlement as one operation. We show that these vertical silos can prevent the full realization of efficincy gains from horizontal consolidation of trading and settlement platforms. Independent of the gains from such consolidation, when costs of settlement are private information, a merger of vertical silos cannot be designed to always ensure efficient trading and settlement after the merger. Furthermore, we show that efficiency can nevertheless be guaranteed either by delegating the operation of settlement platforms to agents or by forcing competition across vertical silos through cross-listings.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1051

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Financial Institutions and Services: General
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Thema
Clearing and Settlement
Cross-listing
Vertical and Horizontal Integration
Mechanism Design

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koeppl, Thorsten
Monnet, Cyril
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Queen's University, Department of Economics
(wo)
Kingston (Ontario)
(wann)
2005

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koeppl, Thorsten
  • Monnet, Cyril
  • Queen's University, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2005

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