Cost asymmetries in international subsidy games: Should governments help winners or losers?

Arbeitspapier

This paper examines the optimality of export subsidies in oligopolistic markets, when home and foreign fires have different costs and there is an opportunity cost to public funds. Subsidies are found to be optimal only for surprisingly lou values of the shadow price of government funds and, if subsidies are justified, they should be higher the more cost-competitive are domestic firms. These results hold under both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition when firms move before governments. The results suggest that recent arguments for export subsidies apply only for firms that would be highly profitable even without subsidies.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Diskussionsbeiträge - Serie II ; No. 147

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Strategic Trade Policy ; Export Subsidies ; Industrial Policy ; Cournot and Bertrand Competition

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Neary, James Peter
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Konstanz, Sonderforschungsbereich 178 - Internationalisierung der Wirtschaft
• (wo): Konstanz
• (wann): 1991

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/101781
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ