Arbeitspapier

Optimal Utilitarian Taxation and Horizontal Equity

We impose a horizontal equity restriction on the problem of finding the optimal utilitarian tax mix. The horizontal equity constraint requires that individuals with the same ability have to pay the same amount of taxes regardless of their preferences for leisure. Contrary to normal findings, we find that a good that is complementary to leisure can be encouraged by the tax system, and that a good that normally should be discouraged by the tax system can be subsidized even if the economy is composed of only two private commodities plus leisure. Also, the marginal effective tax rate can be different from zero at the top (of the ability distribution) when the tax mix obeys the horizontal equity constraint.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 977

Classification
Wirtschaft
Subject
horizontal equity
optimal taxation
heterogeneous preferences
utilitarianism

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Jordahl, Henrik
Micheletto, Luca
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2003

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Jordahl, Henrik
  • Micheletto, Luca
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2003

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