Arbeitspapier

Organizational structure and technological investment

We analyze firms' decisions to adopt a vertical integrated or decentralized structure taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains, where R&D is conducted by upstream sectors. R&D investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the rivals' costs. In a general setup, we show that equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases and we study how final good market competition, spillover, and incentives in innovation interact to determine the optimal vertical structure.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1069

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Noncooperative Games
Thema
R&D
Vertical separation
Market structure
Spillover
R&D
Vertical separation
Market structure
Spillover

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Macho-Stadler, Inés
Matsushima, Noriaki
Shinohara, Ryusuke
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Macho-Stadler, Inés
  • Matsushima, Noriaki
  • Shinohara, Ryusuke
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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