Arbeitspapier
Organizational structure and technological investment
We analyze firms' decisions to adopt a vertical integrated or decentralized structure taking into account the characteristics of both the final good competition and the R&D process. We consider two vertical chains, where R&D is conducted by upstream sectors. R&D investment determines the production costs of the downstream sector and has spillovers on the rivals' costs. In a general setup, we show that equilibrium organizational structure depends on whether the situation considered belongs to one of four possible cases and we study how final good market competition, spillover, and incentives in innovation interact to determine the optimal vertical structure.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 1069
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
R&D
Vertical separation
Market structure
Spillover
R&D
Vertical separation
Market structure
Spillover
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Macho-Stadler, Inés
Matsushima, Noriaki
Shinohara, Ryusuke
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
- (wo)
-
Osaka
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Macho-Stadler, Inés
- Matsushima, Noriaki
- Shinohara, Ryusuke
- Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
Entstanden
- 2019