Arbeitspapier

The evolution of morality

Most of the literature on the evolution of human pro-sociality looks at reasons why evolution made us not play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners’ dilemmas or public goods games. We suggest that in order to understand human morality, and human prosocial behaviour, we should look at reasons why evolution made us not play the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in sequential games, such as the ultimatum game and the trust game. The “rationally irrational” behavior that can evolve in those games is a better match with actual human behaviour, including ingredients of morality such as honesty, responsibility, and sincerity, and also less nice properties, such as anger, as well as the incidence of conflict. Moreover, it can not only explain why humans have evolved to know wrong from right, but also why other animals, with similar population structures and similar rates of repetition, have not evolved the morality that humans have.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-063/I

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
van Veelen, Matthijs
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Tinbergen Institute
(wo)
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • van Veelen, Matthijs
  • Tinbergen Institute

Entstanden

  • 2020

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