Arbeitspapier
The evolution of morality
Most of the literature on the evolution of human pro-sociality looks at reasons why evolution made us not play the Nash equilibrium in prisoners’ dilemmas or public goods games. We suggest that in order to understand human morality, and human prosocial behaviour, we should look at reasons why evolution made us not play the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in sequential games, such as the ultimatum game and the trust game. The “rationally irrational” behavior that can evolve in those games is a better match with actual human behaviour, including ingredients of morality such as honesty, responsibility, and sincerity, and also less nice properties, such as anger, as well as the incidence of conflict. Moreover, it can not only explain why humans have evolved to know wrong from right, but also why other animals, with similar population structures and similar rates of repetition, have not evolved the morality that humans have.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-063/I
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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van Veelen, Matthijs
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
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2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van Veelen, Matthijs
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2020