Artikel
The optimality of team contracts
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities. They can observe and verify each others' effort levels and draft enforceable side-contracts on effort levels and realized returns. Standard constraints, resulting in incentive contracts, fail to ensure implementability, and we examine centralized collusion-proof contracts and decentralized team contracts, as well. We prove that the principal may restrict attention to team contracts whenever returns from the project satisfy a mild monotonicity condition.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 4 ; Year: 2013 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 670-689 ; Basel: MDPI
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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principal-agent problems
linear contracts
collusion
team
decentralization
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Barlo, Mehmet
Özdoægan, Ayça
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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MDPI
- (where)
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Basel
- (when)
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2013
- DOI
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doi:10.3390/g4040670
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Barlo, Mehmet
- Özdoægan, Ayça
- MDPI
Time of origin
- 2013
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