Arbeitspapier
The generosity effect: Fairness in sharing gains and losses
We explore the interaction between fairness attitudes and reference dependence both theoretically and experimentally. Our theory of fairness behavior under reference-dependent preferences in the context of ultimatum games, defines fairness in the utility domain and not in the domain of dollar payments. We test our model predictions using a within-subject design with ultimatum and dictator games involving gains and losses of varying amounts. Proposers indicated their offer in gain- and (neatly comparable) loss- games; responders indicated minimum acceptable gain and maximum acceptable loss. We find a significant generosity effect in the loss domain: on average, proposers bear the largest share of losses as if anticipating responders' call for a smaller share. In contrast, reference dependence hardly affects the outcome of dictator games -where responders have no veto right- though we detect a small but significant compassion effect, whereby dictators are on average somewhat more generous sharing losses than sharing gains.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: ESMT Working Paper ; No. 13-08
- Klassifikation
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Management
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- Thema
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Fairness
loss domain
ultimatum game
dictator game
referencedependent preferences
social preferences
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Baquero, Guillermo
Smit, Willem
Wathieu, Luc
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)
- (wo)
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Berlin
- (wann)
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2013
- Handle
- URN
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urn:nbn:de:101:1-2013091111545
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Baquero, Guillermo
- Smit, Willem
- Wathieu, Luc
- European School of Management and Technology (ESMT)
Entstanden
- 2013