Arbeitspapier

Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self-Employment Income Taxes

I investigate the optimal auditing scheme for a revenue-maximizing tax-collection agency that observes not only reported pro ts, but also the level of employment at each firm. Each firm is owned by a single entrepreneur whose managerial ability is random. The optimal auditing scheme is discontinuous and non-monotone in ability. In intermediate audit costs, less-productive entrepreneurs face auditing probabilities that increase in ability, whereas the ablest ones are not audited. Finally, the effecive tax rate is higher in the middle of the managerial ability distribution; thus, the overall regressive (or progressive) bias that arises from evasion is unknown.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 590

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Zilberman, Eduardo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
(wo)
Rio de Janeiro
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Zilberman, Eduardo
  • Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia

Entstanden

  • 2011

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