Arbeitspapier
Audits or Distortions: The Optimal Scheme to Enforce Self-Employment Income Taxes
I investigate the optimal auditing scheme for a revenue-maximizing tax-collection agency that observes not only reported pro ts, but also the level of employment at each firm. Each firm is owned by a single entrepreneur whose managerial ability is random. The optimal auditing scheme is discontinuous and non-monotone in ability. In intermediate audit costs, less-productive entrepreneurs face auditing probabilities that increase in ability, whereas the ablest ones are not audited. Finally, the effecive tax rate is higher in the middle of the managerial ability distribution; thus, the overall regressive (or progressive) bias that arises from evasion is unknown.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Texto para discussão ; No. 590
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Firm Behavior: Theory
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Zilberman, Eduardo
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
- (wo)
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Rio de Janeiro
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Zilberman, Eduardo
- Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio), Departamento de Economia
Entstanden
- 2011