Arbeitspapier
Subjective Games and Equilibria: I+
Applying the concepts of Nash, Bayesian or correlated equilibrium to analysis of strategic interaction, requires that players possess objective knowledge of the game and opponents' strategies. Such knowledge is often not available. The proposed notions of subjective games, and subjective Nash and correlated equilibria, replace unavailable objective knowledge by subjective assessments. When playing such a game repeatedly, subjective optimizers will converge to a subjective equilibrium. We apply this approach to some well known examples including a single multi-arm bandit player, multi-person mulit-arm bandit games, and repeated Cournot oligopoly games.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1077
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Kalai, Ehud
Lehrer, Ehud
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1993
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Kalai, Ehud
- Lehrer, Ehud
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1993
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Equilibria existence in regular discontinuous games
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Efficiency and equilibria in games of optimal derivative design
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Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games
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Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games
Reciprocal Equilibria in Link Formation Games
Symmetric equilibria in stochastic timing games
Strongly Symmetric Equilibria in Bandit Games
Equilibria existence in regular discontinuous games
The geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria and a generalization of zero-sum games
Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games