Arbeitspapier

Contracts, biases and consumption of access services

We consider a consumption model that takes into account the valuation and demand uncertainties that consumers face while using access services. Typical examples of such services include telecommunication services, extended warranties for consumer electronics, and club memberships. We demonstrate that consumption is affected by contract structure (pay-peruse vs. three part tariffs) even if the optimal consumption plans are identical. We find that a majority of individuals correctly use a threshold policy that is similar to a nearly optimal heuristic, however they use the free units too quickly leading to overconsumption and lost surplus. These errors are partially driven by mistaken beliefs about the value distribution. We also measure subjects' willingness to pay for a contract with free access units, and we find that nearly half of subjects are willing to pay at least the full per-unit price, with a substantial fraction willing to overpay. The optimal firm strategy is therefore to offer a contract that presells access units at a very small discount; this strategy increases revenue by 8 - 15% compared to only offering a pay-per-use contract.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3698

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
Subject
access services
pricing contracts
decision biases
experiment
Konsumentenverhalten
Mehrwertdienst
Vertrag
Bias
Entscheidung
Betriebliche Preispolitik
Test

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Leider, Stephen G.
Sahin, Özge
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2012

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Leider, Stephen G.
  • Sahin, Özge
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2012

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