Artikel

Linkage based on the kandori norm successfully sustains cooperation in social dilemmas

Since social dilemmas among n-persons are often embedded in other types of social exchanges, the exclusion of defectors in social dilemmas from other exchanges functions as a costless selective incentive. Recently, such 'linkage' has been considered as a promising solution to resolve the social dilemma problem. However, previous research showed that cooperation sustained by linkage is fragile when subjective perception errors exist. The purpose of this study is to find linkage strategies that are robust against subjective perception errors. Based on the strategies presented in previous studies on indirect reciprocity, we devised several linkage strategies and examined their evolutionary stability by agent-based simulation. The simulation results showed that the linkage strategy based on kandori was evolutionarily stable even when perception errors existed. Our study provides substantial support for the argument that linkage is a plausible solution to the social dilemma problem.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 1-15 ; Basel: MDPI

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
linked game
social dilemma
public goods game
indirect reciprocity
agent-based simulation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Inaba, Misato
Takahashi, Nobuyuki
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
MDPI
(wo)
Basel
(wann)
2019

DOI
doi:10.3390/g10010010
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Artikel

Beteiligte

  • Inaba, Misato
  • Takahashi, Nobuyuki
  • MDPI

Entstanden

  • 2019

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