Artikel

An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form

An extension of the Shapley value for games in partition function form is proposed in the paper. We introduce a version of the marginal contributions for environments with externalities. The dummy property related to it is defined. We adapt the system of axioms provided by Shapley (A value for n-Person games. In: Kuhn H, Tucker A (eds) Contributions to the theory of games II. Princeton University Press, Princeton, pp 307317, 1953) to characterize our value. In addition, we discuss a relationship between the a-Shapley values proposed by Fujinaka (On the marginality principle in partition function form games. Mimeo, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University, Japan, 2004) and the values constructed through the average approach provided by Macho-Stadler et al. (J Econ Theory 135:339-356, 2007).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: SERIEs - Journal of the Spanish Economic Association ; ISSN: 1869-4195 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2010 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 475-487 ; Heidelberg: Springer

Classification
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Externalities
Subject
externalities
marginal contributions
shapley value
Externer Effekt
Shapley-Wert
Kooperatives Spiel
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Hu, Cheng-Cheng
Yang, Yi-You
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Springer
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2010

DOI
doi:10.1007/s13209-009-0004-9
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Hu, Cheng-Cheng
  • Yang, Yi-You
  • Springer

Time of origin

  • 2010

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