Arbeitspapier
Towards a Justification the Principle of Coordination
Different variations of a Principle of Coordination are used in anumber ofdifferent research traditions. Roughly speaking, one version of thePrinciple says thatif there is a unique Pareto-efficient outcome in a game, then playerswill choose theirpart of that outcome. In this paper I will investigate thefoundations of the Principleand see to what extent the Principle follows from some axiomsregarding rationalindividual decision-making.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-017/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Thema
-
Spieltheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Janssen, Maarten C.W.
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2000
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