Arbeitspapier

Independent Auditors as Fiscal Gatekeepers

This paper develops a framework for the analysis of gatekeeping in tax enforcement, whereby independent auditors are assigned the duty of certifying taxpayers` reports. The equilibrium of the market for gatekeepers` services is characterized, as well as taxpayers` and auditors` optimal behavior. The paper discusses the optimal structure of the gatekeeping regime and determines the conditions under which it is socially preferable to direct public enforcement.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 286

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(where)
Bologna
(when)
1997

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/5024
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Franzoni, Luigi Alberto
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Time of origin

  • 1997

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