Optimal regulatory design for the Central Bank of Russia

Arbeitspapier

The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) assumes a wide range of functions not raditional to a central bank.In addition to the daily conduct of monetary policy, it acts as a regulator and supervisor of the banking sector.It is currently overssing the implementation of a deposit insurance scheme and is the main owner of Russia's largest commercial bank, Sberbank.As this additional functions may conflict with the CBR policy objectives, I review how the current design of the CBR deviates from the optimal allocation of regulatory powers within a central bank prescribed in the literature.I then empirically investigate the need for a supervisory body within the CBR.Using a simple Taylor rule framework I find that the CBR does not use its "hands-on" supervisory information to maintain financial stability, but rather to accomodate state-owned banks' balances.

Object Details

• ISBN: 952-462-780-9
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: BOFIT Discussion Papers ; No. 7/2005

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Banks; Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages ; Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation
• Subject: Central Bank ; Prudential Regulation and Supervision ; Monetary Policy Rules ; Russia

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Claeys, Sophie
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT)
• (where): Helsinki
• (when): 2005

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/212559
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET