A Macroeconomic Model of Imperfect Competition with Patent Licensing

Abstract: This paper sets up an imperfectly competitive macroeconomic model that features the strategic interaction between the patent-holding firm and licensees, and uses it to analyze the relevant macro-variables under various licensing arrangements. Some main findings emerge from the analysis. First, the equilibrium aggregate output and aggregate consumption under fixed-fee and royalty licensing regimes are always greater than those under the no licensing regime. Moreover, the equilibrium aggregate output and consumption under the fixed-fee licensing regime are always greater than those under the royalty licensing regime. Second, with the higher (lower) technology level the patent holder prefers the fixed-fee (royalty) contract. Third, welfare could be improved through technology transfer, and the level of welfare under the fixed-fee licensing regime is higher than that under the royalty licensing regime. Lastly, this paper discusses some extensions of the baseline model.

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: A Macroeconomic Model of Imperfect Competition with Patent Licensing ; volume:15 ; number:4 ; year:2015 ; pages:1579-1618 ; extent:40 ; The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy ; 15, Heft 4 (2015), 1579-1618 (gesamt 40)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Hsieh, Hui-ting ; Lai, Ching-chong ; Chen, Kuan-jen

Further information

• DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2013-0144
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2408251607318.025476721347
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 15.08.2025, 7:20 AM CEST