Arbeitspapier
Evolution towards asymptotic efficiency, preliminary version
We show that in long repeated games, or in infinitely repeated games with discount rate close to one, payoffs corresponding to evolutionary stable sets are asymptotically efficient, as intuition suggests. Actions played at the beginning of the game are used as messages that allow players to coordinate on Pareto optimal outcomes in the following stages. The result builds a bridge between the theory of repeated games and that of communication games.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Quaderni di Dipartimento ; No. 173
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Demichelis, Stefano
- Università degli Studi di Pavia, Dipartimento di Economia Politica e Metodi Quantitativi (EPMQ)
Entstanden
- 2012