Arbeitspapier

The Business of Piracy in Somalia

This article argues that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to control Somali piracy for four reasons. First, Somali piracy is a land-based problem and naval control mechanisms are not changing the incentives for pirates. Second, improving Somalia's anarchic political situation will not necessarily stop piracy. Our analysis demonstrates that piracy is a business which improves with a more stable operating environment. Third, piracy is organized criminal activity, and like other organized crime groups will be difficult to control, especially if it becomes embedded in state structures. Finally, we argue that few of the relevant players have any real incentives to alter their behaviour.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: DIW Discussion Papers ; No. 1033

Classification
Wirtschaft
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
Other Economic Systems: Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
Subject
Piracy
Somalia
Law Enforcement
Organised Crime
EU Atalanta

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Percy, Sarah
Shortland, Anja
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2011

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Percy, Sarah
  • Shortland, Anja
  • Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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