Group formation and voter participation

Artikel

We present a model of participation in large elections in which the formation of voter groups is endogenous. Partisan citizens decide whether to become leaders (activists) and try to persuade impressionable citizens to vote for the leaders' preferred party. In the (unique) pure strategy equilibrium, the number of leaders favoring each party depends on the cost of activism and the importance of the election. In turn, the expected turnout and the winning margin in an election depend on the number of leaders and the strength of social interactions. The model predicts a nonmonotonic relationship between the expected turnout and the winning margin in large elections.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 1 ; Year: 2006 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 461-487 ; New York, NY: The Econometric Society

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Subject: Voter mobilization ; endogenous leaders ; turnout ; winning margin

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Herrera, Helios ; Martinelli, Cesar
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Econometric Society
• (where): New York, NY
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/150088
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET