Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Arbeitspapier

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 070

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
• Thema: dispute resolution system ; market design ; reputation ; trust

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bolton, Gary E. ; Breuer, Kevin ; Greiner, Ben ; Ockenfels, Axel
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (wo): Bonn and Cologne
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237315
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ