Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Arbeitspapier

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 070

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
• Subject: dispute resolution system ; market design ; reputation ; trust

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Bolton, Gary E. ; Breuer, Kevin ; Greiner, Ben ; Ockenfels, Axel
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (where): Bonn and Cologne
• (when): 2021

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237315
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET