Artikel
Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets
Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ; ISSN: 1530-9134 ; Volume: 32 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 247-256 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Bolton, Gary
Breuer, Kevin
Greiner, Ben
Ockenfels, Axel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wiley
- (where)
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Hoboken, NJ
- (when)
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2023
- DOI
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doi:10.1111/jems.12512
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Artikel
Associated
- Bolton, Gary
- Breuer, Kevin
- Greiner, Ben
- Ockenfels, Axel
- Wiley
Time of origin
- 2023