Artikel

Fixing feedback revision rules in online markets

Feedback withdrawal mechanisms in online markets aim to facilitate the resolution of conflicts during transactions. Yet, frequently used online feedback withdrawal rules are flawed and may backfire by inviting strategic transaction and feedback behavior. Our laboratory experiment shows how a small change in the design of feedback withdrawal rules, allowing unilateral rather than mutual withdrawal, can both reduce incentives for strategic gaming and improve coordination of expectations. This leads to less trading risk, more cooperation, and higher market efficiency.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ; ISSN: 1530-9134 ; Volume: 32 ; Year: 2023 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 247-256 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Bolton, Gary
Breuer, Kevin
Greiner, Ben
Ockenfels, Axel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Wiley
(where)
Hoboken, NJ
(when)
2023

DOI
doi:10.1111/jems.12512
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Bolton, Gary
  • Breuer, Kevin
  • Greiner, Ben
  • Ockenfels, Axel
  • Wiley

Time of origin

  • 2023

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