Generalized projection dynamics in evolutionary game theory

Arbeitspapier

We introduce a new kind of projection dynamics by employing a ray-projection both locally and globally. By global (local) we mean a projection of a vector (close to the unit simplex) unto the unit simplex along a ray through the origin. Using a correspondence between local and global ray-projection dynamics we prove that every interior evolutionarily stable strategy is an asymptotically stable fixed point. We also show that every strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable state and an evolutionarily stable equilibrium. Then, we employ several projections on a wider set of functions derived from the payoff structure. This yields an interesting class of so-called generalized projection dynamics which contains best-response, logit, replicator, and Brown-Von-Neumann dynamics among others.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Papers on Economics and Evolution ; No. 0811

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines ; Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; Noncooperative Games ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Joosten, Reinoud ; Roorda, Berend
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/32642
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET