Transboundary pollution, R&D spillovers, absorptive capacity and international trade

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, we consider a non-cooperative and symmetric three-stage game model composed by two regulator-firm hierarchies. By means of adequate emission taxes, original and absorptive research and development (R&D) subsidies we prove that regulators can reach the non-cooperative social optimum. In the presence of free R&D spillovers between countries, as well as the investment in absorptive research, the competition of firms on a common market helps non-cooperating countries to better internalize transboundary pollution. We find that in autarky and common market cases the investment in absorptive R&D leads to multiple non-cooperative equilibria, which may necessitate competing regulators to coordinate an equilibrium. Interestingly, opening markets to international trade increases the per-unit emission-tax and the per-unit original research subsidy. It causes a higher investment in original research and production, and a lower emission ratio.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Economics Discussion Papers ; No. 2013-23

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Taxation and Subsidies: Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; Management of Technological Innovation and R&D ; Externalities
• Thema: Transboundary pollution ; R&D spillovers ; absorptive capacity ; international trade

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Dinar, Zeineb
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW)
• (wo): Kiel
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70798
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ