Arbeitspapier

Malleability of Preferences for Honesty

Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences for honesty are malleable and what determines them. We experimentally measure preferences for honesty in a sample of children. As our main result, we provide causal evidence on the effect of the social environment by randomly enrolling children in a year-long mentoring programme. We find that, about four years after the end of the programme, mentored children are significantly more honest.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14304

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
Subject
honesty
lying
truth-telling
formation of preferences
experiments with children

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Abeler, Johannes
Falk, Armin
Kosse, Fabian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(where)
Bonn
(when)
2021

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Abeler, Johannes
  • Falk, Armin
  • Kosse, Fabian
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Time of origin

  • 2021

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