Arbeitspapier

Malleability of Preferences for Honesty

Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences for honesty are malleable and what determines them. We experimentally measure preferences for honesty in a sample of children. As our main result, we provide causal evidence on the effect of the social environment by randomly enrolling children in a year-long mentoring programme. We find that, about four years after the end of the programme, mentored children are significantly more honest.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14304

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
Thema
honesty
lying
truth-telling
formation of preferences
experiments with children

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Abeler, Johannes
Falk, Armin
Kosse, Fabian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2021

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Abeler, Johannes
  • Falk, Armin
  • Kosse, Fabian
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2021

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