Arbeitspapier
Malleability of Preferences for Honesty
Reporting private information is a key part of economic decision making. A recent literature has found that many people have a preference for honest reporting, contrary to usual economic assumptions. In this paper, we investigate whether preferences for honesty are malleable and what determines them. We experimentally measure preferences for honesty in a sample of children. As our main result, we provide causal evidence on the effect of the social environment by randomly enrolling children in a year-long mentoring programme. We find that, about four years after the end of the programme, mentored children are significantly more honest.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 14304
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth
- Thema
-
honesty
lying
truth-telling
formation of preferences
experiments with children
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Abeler, Johannes
Falk, Armin
Kosse, Fabian
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
- (wo)
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Bonn
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Abeler, Johannes
- Falk, Armin
- Kosse, Fabian
- Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2021