Arbeitspapier
Nationalization as credible threat against tacit collusion
Within a simple model of differentiated oligopoly, we show that tacit collusion may be prevented by the threat of nationalising a private firm coupled with the appropriate choice of the weight given to private profits in the maximand of the nationalised company. We characterise the properties of such a threat and prove that it may allow to credibly deter tacit collusion.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 972
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Economics of Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Nationalization
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Public Enterprises; Public-Private Enterprises
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Delbono, Flavio
Lambertini, Luca
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (where)
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Bologna
- (when)
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2014
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4091
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Delbono, Flavio
- Lambertini, Luca
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Time of origin
- 2014
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Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach
R&D-hindering collusion
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Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly
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Trade Liberalization May Be Harmful under Endogenous Differentiation
Cartel Stability Under Vertical Differentiation and Convex costs: Bertrand vs Cournot
Exogenous Product Differentiation and the Stability of Collusion
Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion
Optimal Fiscal Stabilization Policy With Credible Central Bank Independence
Collusion Helps Abate Environmental Pollution: A Dynamic Approach
R&D-hindering collusion
Standardization and the Stability of Collusion
Managerial delegation in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly
Optimal Product Proliferation in Monopoly: A Dynamic Analysis
Quantum Mechanics and Mathematical Economics are Isomorphic. John von Neumann between Physics and Economics
Delegation and Cartel Stability
Trade Liberalization May Be Harmful under Endogenous Differentiation