Arbeitspapier
Finding all minimal CURB sets
Sets closed under rational behavior were introduced by Basu and Weibull (1991) as subsets of the strategy space that contain all best replies to all strategy profiles in the set. We here consider a more restrictive notion of closure under rational behavior: a subset of the strategy space is strongly closed under rational behavior, or sCURB, if it contains all best replies to all probabilistic beliefs over the set. We present an algorithm that computes all minimal sCURB sets in any given finite game. Runtime measurements on two-player games (where the concepts of CURB and sCURB coincide) show that the algorithm is considerably faster than the earlier developed algorithm, that of Benisch et al. (2006).
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 722
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Mathematical Methods
Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Computational Techniques; Simulation Modeling
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
-
curb sets
rational behavior
rationalizability
minimality
Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Spieltheorie
Rationale Erwartung
Mathematik
Algorithmus
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Klimm, Max
Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (where)
-
Stockholm
- (when)
-
2009
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Klimm, Max
- Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Time of origin
- 2009
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