National Transmission System Operators in an International Electricity Market

Arbeitspapier

This paper develops a framework for analyzing the incentives of national transmission system operators (TSOs) to supply cross-border interconnection capacity in an international electricity market. Our results show that equilibrium transmission capacity is downward distorted, even in situations where full capacity utilization is inefficient. We derive a method for quantifying these distortions and propose a market design that uniquely implements efficient dispatch of electricity. In this design, the distribution of trade adjustment payments causes TSOs to internalize the full effect of network congestion. The design would improve, for instance, on the current European market design.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1394

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Economic Integration ; Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation ; Electric Utilities ; Renewable Resources and Conservation: Issues in International Trade ; Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices
• Thema: International electricity market ; Market design ; Market power ; Network congestion

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Horn, Henrik ; Tangerås, Thomas P.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/240537
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ