Arbeitspapier

Inflation and unemployment in competitive search equilibrium

Using a monetary search model, Rocheteau, Rupert and Wright (2007) show that the relationship between inflation and unemployment can be positive or negative depending on the primitives of the model. The key features are indivisible labor, nonseparable preferences and bargaining. Their results are derived only for a special case of the bargaining solution, take-it-or-leave-it offer by buyers. Instead of bargaining, this paper considers competitive search (price posting with directed search). I show that the results in Rocheteau, Rupert and Wright (2007) can be generalized in an environment where both buyers and sellers have nonseparable preferences. In addition, the relationship between inflation and unemployment is robust to allowing free entry by sellers, which cannot be studied in Rocheteau, Rupert and Wright (2007).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Bank of Canada Working Paper ; No. 2010-15

Classification
Wirtschaft
Money and Interest Rates: General
Monetary Policy
General Aggregative Models: Keynes; Keynesian; Post-Keynesian
General Aggregative Models: Neoclassical
Subject
Inflation: costs and benefits
Inflationsrate
Arbeitslosigkeit
Arbeitsangebot
Unteilbarkeit
Verhandlungsmacht
Theorie

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Dong, Mei
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bank of Canada
(where)
Ottawa
(when)
2010

DOI
doi:10.34989/swp-2010-15
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Dong, Mei
  • Bank of Canada

Time of origin

  • 2010

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