Arbeitspapier

Do Minorities Misrepresent Their Ethnicity to Avoid Discrimination?

Discrimination against minorities is pervasive in many societies, but little is known about minorities’ strategies to avoid being discriminated against. In our trust game among 758 high-school students in the country of Georgia, ethnic Georgian trustors discriminate against the ethnic Armenian minority group. We introduce an initial signaling stage to investigate Armenians’ willingness to hide their ethnicity to avoid expected discrimination. 43 percent of Armenian trustees untruthfully signal to have a Georgian name. Signaling behavior is driven by expected transfers and non-pecuniary motives. This strategic misrepresentation of ethnicity increases Georgian trustors’ expected back transfers and eliminates their discriminatory behavior.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7861

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Field Experiments
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination
Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: General‡
Thema
discrimination
trust game
experiment
signaling
adolescents

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Kudashvili, Nikoloz
Lergetporer, Philipp
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2019

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Kudashvili, Nikoloz
  • Lergetporer, Philipp
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2019

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