Arbeitspapier

Monetary and Social Incentives in Multi-Tasking: The Ranking Substitution Effect

Rankings are prevalent information and incentive tools in labor markets with strong competition for talent. In a dynamic model of multi-tasking and an accompanying experiment with financial professionals, we identify hidden ranking costs when performance in one task is incentivized and ranked while another prosocial task is not: (i) a ranking influences behavior if individuals lag behind: they spend more total effort and substitute effort in the prosocial task with effort in the ranked task; (ii) those ahead in the ranking spend less total effort and lower relative effort in the ranked task. Implications for incentive schemes are discussed.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 13345

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Field Experiments
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making‡
Thema
multi-tasking decision problem
rank incentives
framed field experiment
finance professionals

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Stefan, Matthias
Huber, Jürgen
Kirchler, Michael
Sutter, Matthias
Walzl, Markus
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2020

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Stefan, Matthias
  • Huber, Jürgen
  • Kirchler, Michael
  • Sutter, Matthias
  • Walzl, Markus
  • Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2020

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