A tale of two tails: Preferences of neutral third-parties in three-player ultimatum games

Arbeitspapier

We present a three-player game in which a proposer makes a suggestion on how to split $10 with a passive responder. The offer is accepted or rejected depending on the strategy pro le of a neutral third-party whose payoffs are independent from his decisions. If the offer is accepted the split takes place as suggested, if rejected, then both proposer and receiver get $0. Our results show a decision-maker whose main concern is to reduce the inequality between proposer and responder and who, in order to do so, is willing to reject both selfish and generous offers. This pattern of rejections is robust through a series of treatments which include changing the "flat-fee" payoff of the decision-maker, introducing a monetary cost for the decision-maker in case the offer ends up in a rejection, or letting a computer replace the proposer to randomly make the splitting suggestion between proposer and responder. Further, through these different treatments we are able to show that decision-makers ignore the intentions behind the proposers suggestions, as well as ignoring their own relative payoffs, two surprising results given the existing literature.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2014-057

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; Personal Income, Wealth, and Their Distributions
• Thema: Ultimatum game ; experiment ; fairness ; third party

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Bosch-Rosa, Ciril
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/103782
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ