Arbeitspapier
Resale price maintenance and manufacturer competition for retail services
We investigate the incentives of manufacturers to use resale price maintenance (RPM) when selling products through common retailers. In our model retailers provide product specific pre-sales services. If the competitive retail margins are low, each manufacturer fixes a minimum price to induce favorable retail services. With symmetric manufacturers, products are equally profitable in equilibrium and no product is favored as without RPM, but retail prices are higher. We show that minimum RPM can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even decreasing the overall service quality. This challenges the service argument as an efficiency defense for RPM.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 12-028
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
- Thema
-
biased sales advice
common agency
manufacturer dilemma
matching
retail service
RPM
vertical restraints
Preisbindung
Verarbeitendes Gewerbe
Ökonomischer Anreiz
Einzelhandel
Unternehmensdienstleistung
Verkauf
Dienstleistungsqualität
Gefangenendilemma
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Hunold, Matthias
Muthers, Johannes
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bsz:180-madoc-322458
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Hunold, Matthias
- Muthers, Johannes
- Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
Entstanden
- 2012