Arbeitspapier

Uncertain Altruism and Non-Linear Long-Term Care Policies

We study the design of public long-term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non-linear policies where the LTC benefit depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable while children’s altruism is not. The traditional topping up and opting out policies are special cases of ours. Both total and informal care should increase with the children’s level of altruism. This obtains under full and asymmetric information. Social LTC, on the other hand, may be non-monotonic. Under asymmetric information, social LTC is lower than its full information level for the lowest level of altruism, while it is distorted upward for the higher level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to high-altruism children. The implementing contract is always such that social care increases with formal care.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7129

Classification
Wirtschaft
Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
Subject
long term care
uncertain altruism
private insurance
public insurance
topping up
opting out

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Canta, Chiara
Cremer, Helmuth
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2018

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Canta, Chiara
  • Cremer, Helmuth
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2018

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