Artikel
Tolerance of noncompliance: Discretion rather than simple rules?
We argue that societies sometimes choose not to enforce the law to gain 'flexibility'. Especially developing countries face a dilemma between discretion and commitment to only partially-contingent rules. Rules are good for incentives, but discretion may be more 'flexible'. We embed this dilemma in a political model and show that citizens will not support strong enforcement institutions unless the state is able to commit to sufficiently sophisticated redistributive policies.
- Weitere Titel
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Tolerancia al incumplimiento: ¿discreción en lugar de reglas simples?
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Estudios de Economía ; ISSN: 0718-5286 ; Volume: 46 ; Year: 2019 ; Issue: 1 ; Pages: 31-59
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Informal Economy; Underground Economy
Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
- Thema
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Discretion
commitment
simple rules
informality
enforcement
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Forteza, Alvaro
Noboa, Cecilia
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
- (wo)
-
Santiago de Chile
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Forteza, Alvaro
- Noboa, Cecilia
- Universidad de Chile, Departamento de Economía
Entstanden
- 2019
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