Unilateral climate policy, the Green Paradox, Coalition Size and Stability

Arbeitspapier

We incorporate three important aspects of current climate policy, unilateralism, demand side approach and a climate target, in a multi-country model with flow dependent fossil fuel extraction costs and a backstop. It turns out that the optimal climate coalition should encompass all countries which are concerned about global warming and that the carbon tax increases initially to approach zero later on. While a fast increasing tax may cause an increase of early fossil fuel extraction (weak green paradox), a sufficiently large climate coalition can guarantee the adherence to the climate target. We present both a sufficient coalition size rule and the stable coalition size evolution path. It is shown that the results are robust to a stock dependence of extraction costs.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge ; No. 172-14

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices ; Alternative Energy Sources ; Climate; Natural Disasters and Their Management; Global Warming ; Environmental Economics: Government Policy
• Thema: climate change ; climate target ; unilateral climate policy

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kollenbach, Gilbert
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Universität Siegen, Fakultät III, Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht
• (wo): Siegen
• (wann): 2014

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/108826
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ