Arbeitspapier

International environmental negotiations: Does coalition size matter?

This paper reconsiders a widely used game of coalition formation in international environmental negotiations. Due to the mathematical problems of giving a full characterization of the solution, up to now most of the work on this subject rested on numerical simulations to derive results. In this paper we show for a general class of payoff functions that when the game is approximated by assuming a continuum of players, a solution can be found. Using this result as a "benchmark solution", we further show that gains from cooperation resulting in simulations are due to an "integer effect", i.e. coalition size being treated as a discrete variable.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 00/20

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rutz, Samuel
Borek, Thomas
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rutz, Samuel
  • Borek, Thomas
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2000

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