Arbeitspapier
International environmental negotiations: Does coalition size matter?
This paper reconsiders a widely used game of coalition formation in international environmental negotiations. Due to the mathematical problems of giving a full characterization of the solution, up to now most of the work on this subject rested on numerical simulations to derive results. In this paper we show for a general class of payoff functions that when the game is approximated by assuming a continuum of players, a solution can be found. Using this result as a "benchmark solution", we further show that gains from cooperation resulting in simulations are due to an "integer effect", i.e. coalition size being treated as a discrete variable.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 00/20
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Rutz, Samuel
Borek, Thomas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
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2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Rutz, Samuel
- Borek, Thomas
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2000