How radical is perceptual malleability? A reply to commentators

Abstract: The unifying theme across all four commentaries is the question: just how radical are the ideas contained in, and implied by, Thinking and Perceiving? Does the abandonment of the modularity of mind, and an embrace of the malleability of mind, have wide reaching consequences for empirical studies of sensory perception, for cognitive architecture, for the metaphysics of mind and the epistemology of perception? And which of those consequences are welcomed, and which of those are problematic? These general questions anchor in (at least) the following topics: learning and the role of cognition, object recognition, perceptual expertise, early versus late vision, perception and truth, virtue epistemology, and computational architectures of mind. This reply attempts to address the overarching question from this variety of angles taken in the four commentaries. https://philosophymindscience.org/index.php/phimisci/article/view/10954

Object Details

• Location: Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
• Extent: Online-Ressource
• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: How radical is perceptual malleability? A reply to commentators ; volume:4 ; year:2023 ; Philosophy and the mind sciences ; 4 (2023)

Contributors, Places and Time

• Creator: Stokes, Dustin R.

Further information

• DOI: 10.33735/phimisci.2023.10954
• URN: urn:nbn:de:101:1-2023071218543944944293
• Rights: Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
• Last update: 14.08.2025, 10:45 AM CEST