Selfish and Prospective: Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting

Arbeitspapier

We present and test a theory of prospective and retrospective pocketbook voting. Focusing on two large reforms in Sweden, we establish a causal chain from policies to sizeable individual gains and losses and then to voting. The Social Democrats proposed budget cuts affecting parents with young children before the 1994 election, but made generous promises to the same group before the 1998 election. Since parents with older children were largely unaffected we use a difference-in-differences strategy for identification. We find clear evidence of prospective pocketbook voting. Voters respond to campaign promises but not to the later implementation of the reforms.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 770

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Single Equation Models; Single Variables: Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: General
• Thema: Elections ; Economic voting ; Pocketbook voting ; Self-interest ; Prospective voting ; Retrospective voting ; Child care ; Wahlverhalten ; Eigeninteresse ; Kinderbetreuung ; Schweden

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Elinder, Mikael ; Jordahl, Henrik ; Poutvaara, Panu
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/81329
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ